In a recent pair of articles (Redei 1996 (Redei , 1997, Miklos Redei has taken enormous strides toward characterizing the conditions under which relativistic quantum field theory is a safe setting for the deployment of causal talk. Here, we challenge the adequacy of the accounts of causal dependence and screening off on which rests the relevance of Redei's theorems to the question of causal good behavior in the theory.
1. Introduction Non-relativistic quantum mechanics posits correlations, even perfect ones, between spatially separated events. Suggesting spooky action at a distance, these correlations gave Einstein the creeps. They haunt others too: a bountiful literature addresses the question of whether distant Bell-type correlations reveal the activity of superluminal causes at the quantum level. Part of what nourishes this literature is folklore's insistence that the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) prohibits faster-than-light causal influences. An interpreted quantum theory committed to such influences would be incompatible with STR thus understood. But perhaps the worst sort of incompatibility would be one which arrests physics, by rendering physicists incapable of building new theories incorporating both quantum and relativistic elements.
Fortunately, in relativistic quantum field theories (RQFTs), we have what amounts to a prima 2 facie constructive proof that the situation is not so dire. But while soothing incompatibility worries raised by the spectre of superluminal causation, RQFTs don't thereby lay that spectre to rest.
For RQFTs sustain states-notably the Minkowski vacuum state-which institute problematic correlations between observables pertaining to spacelike separated regions. These correlations are thoroughgoing: for any two spacelike separated regions, the Minkowski vacuum correlates any observable from one with some observable from the other (Redhead 1995) . And they're generic: any RQFT admitting one state instituting such correlations admits a dense set of such states (cf. Clifton et alia, 1997) . So, are the vacuum correlations of RQFT evidence of superluminal causation?
In the RQFT setting, the issue is less urgent than in the non-relativistic folkloric setting, where a positive answer rushed the STR to judgement. Here a positive answer simply indicates that causes in RQFT aren't behaving as causes ought. The Lorentz invariance of RQFT doesn't prohibit the superluminal causation intimated by distant correlations but exacts for it at least this price: the availability of reference frames in which superluminal causes come after their effects, in gross defiance of our expectations about the invariance of causal priority. But why should it matter whether causes in RQFT behave as causes ought? One sort of answer to this question starts with the idea (a venerable one, and not crazy) that we acquire scientific understanding of a domain by figuring out how causes operate there. Reichenbach's Principle of the Common Cause gives this idea helpful expression. Reichenbach's Principle channels the pursuit of understanding thus understood, by indicating not only when a causal account-and so the understanding it funds-is incomplete, but also what would count as extending it. A condition of the possibility of understanding RQFT, on this model of understanding, is that something behaves in RQFT as causes ought. To establish this we must, first, extend the notion of cause into the RQFT setting, and, second, investigate whether RQFT constrains causes thus understood to behave as causes ought. We here investigate the contribution to this literature of Miklos Redei, who supposes that causes behaving as causes ought behave subluminally and in obedience to Reichenbach's Principle (Redei 1996, 29; , 1310 .
A set of rough causal expectations-which are, after all, not arbitrary, but derived from our understanding of causal operations in familiar domains-helps orient our extension of causal notions into new domains. These expectations suggest that the question of causal good behavior is settled positively in some situations but problematic in others. For example, where wellbehaved causes are taken to act only subluminally, the behavior question is settled positively in situations wherein spatially separated events are statistically independent, but remains problematic in situations where such events are correlated. To answer these open questions requires refining rough causal expectations into an explicit account of cause.
Suppose, then, we were to craft an account of cause in light of which questions about causal good behavior in problematic situations are answered positively because they reduce to questions about causal good behavior in unproblematic ones. In doing so, we would be following a familiar recipe for success in philosophical analysis. But the result will be palatable only if we've respected the sense, built into our rough causal expectations, that the straightforward and settled questions are importantly unlike the difficult open ones. This respect is not a taboo on closing open questions, but a commitment to explain, when our analysis reduces hard questions to easy ones, why what we took to be important differences between the questions makes no difference to the issue of causal good behavior. Only such respect for open questions can assure us that the analysis succeeds by extending the core notion of cause rather than changing the subject. A maximally reassuring case for causal good behavior in RQFT will offer an analysis of cause which does not change the subject, and shows that causes thus understood are well-behaved. Any account falling short of maximal reassurance should inspire us not only to revisit the analysis of causation involved, but also, at the next level of abstraction, the model of scientific understanding on which it rests.
In a recent pair of articles (Redei 1996 (Redei , 1997 , Miklos Redei has taken enormous strides toward characterizing the conditions under which RQFT is a safe setting for the deployment of causal talk. His 1996 constructs a RQFT-suitable notion of causal dependence, in terms of a formal apparatus associating local events with the projections in algebras of observables the field theory associates with any open, bounded region of spacetime. The paper's key result is that if the algebras of observables associated with spacelike separated regions enjoy the property of C*-independence (a property about which we'll have only slightly more to say later), then no event in one algebra causally depends on any event in the other. Redei takes this result to exorcise the spectre of superluminal causation haunting the violation of Bell-type inequalities in RQFT because that violation occurs for pairs of spacelike separated local algebras which are C*-independent. In light of the result, Redei would have us conclude that the mere violation of Bell-type inequalities is insufficient for superluminal causation. Redei's heartening moral is that Bell-type correlations in RQFT do not saddle the theory with gross causal misbehavior (1996, 31 ). Redei's 1997 complements his 1996 insofar as its main concern is the hospitality of RQFT to causal good behavior, understood as behavior obedient to Reichenbach's Principle. There he offers a criterion for when the correlations a state establishes between elements of distant algebras are screened off in that state. The key theorem of this second paper states that if the distant correlations posited by the Minkowski vacuum state are screened off, then the local algebras housing the events distantly correlated are C*-independent. However, this theorem does not settle the most pressing question, according to Redei (1997 Redei ( , 1318 , which is whether all, or even any, distant correlations can be screened off in the vacuum.
Our main concern here will be the adequacy of accounts of causal dependence and screening off on which rests the relevance of Redei's theorems to the question of causal good behavior in RQFT. We've suggested respect for open questions as a criterion of adequacy for an analysis of cause. In this paper we argue that Redei's analysis fails to show this respect. Our strategy is to translate the Redei-made notions back into the homely setting of Bell-type correlations in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Our translations reveal that Redei's analysis collapses challenging open causal questions into simple settled ones without addressing their dissimilarities in light of which our rough causal expectations deem one set of questions easy, the other hard.
Uncommon Causes
We all learned at our mothers' knees to associate the (pure) states of quantum theory with vectors in a Hilbert space, to define quantum observables as operators acting on that space, and to infuse this formalism with empirical content by taking the expection value of an observable O in a state |ψ> to be <ψ|O|ψ>. The algebraic approach to QFT turns these lessons on their head. It associates observables with elements of an abstract algebra A, and takes states to be linear functionals mapping observables in the algebra to real numbers which we understand as their expectation values in that state. One advantage of the algebraic formulation is that it enables us to finesse troubling issues concerning the unitary inequivalence of distinct and independently acceptable Hilbert space representations of QFT in curved spacetime (for details, see Wald 1994, §4.5) . Every algebraic representation of a state gives rise to a Hilbert space representation (the so-called GNS representation) in the following sense:
where A is an algebra of observables and ω a state over that algebra, there exists a Hilbert space H, a map from elements of A to operators on H, and a (cyclic) state |ξ> in H such that ω(A) = <ξ| (A)| ξ> for all A∈A. An axiom of algebraic RQFT is that such a representation corresponding to a "physically reasonable" vacuum state |Ω> exists. The map |Ω> also enables us to identify A with an ordinary von Neumann algebra of Hilbert space operators.
ARQFT for Minkowski space-time associates von Neumann algebras of operators {A(V)} with open, bounded sets {V} in the spacetime. The global algebra is built from these local ones subject to constraints set down in the axioms of ARQFT (for more on algebras and ARQFT, consult Horuzhy 1990). For our purposes, the most significant of these axioms is 
Neumann algebras). (39)
Indeed the algebras at issue in ARQFT are type III von Neumann algebras, but our review of the proof of (R) makes plain that the type of algebra at issue is irrelevant to the success of the proof.
What earns commuting algebras (be they fancy or homely) Redei-made causal independence is solely their possession of the Schleider property, and both the local spacelike-seperated ARQFT algebras and the spin algebras have it. Redei does use special features of Type III algebras to
show that "algebras belonging to causally dependent spacetime regions are not independent in the probabilistic counterfactual sense" (35, 39) . But this is a result distinct from the one we've translated and, having translated, deflated.
Redei also cites aesthetic grounds in support of his notion of causal dependence. For one, it fits nicely into the received heirarchy of statistical independence conditions in ARQFT (33).
For another, it exhibits a "natural constraint" Redei would impose on any weakenings of his notion (which weakenings he, recognizing that his notion might seem overstrong, encourages all hands to pursue). Weaker notions of causal dependence "should distinguish local observable algebras that belong to causally non-independent regions from those that are associated with space-like separated ones" (40). Notice how this natural condition identifies "causally independent regions" with spacelike separated ones! In the context of articulating a notion of causal dependence with respect to which we might pursue a live question of whether ARQFT posits such dependence between space-like separated regions, to impose this "natural" condition is, we would suggest, to beg the question. 
Common Causes
Call such a C a probabilistic common cause of A and B.
In the Redei-made analysis of screening off above, (i) assures that we deal only with "genuinely probabilistic common causes" C that stop short of logically entailing their effects, where C ⊆ A iff the projection C has a range contained within the range of A. (ii) assures that (iv)'s Lüder's conditional probabilities, which express Reichenbach's probabilistic conditions on the common cause, make sense. And (iii) is supposed to assure that the analysis remains within the friendly confines of commutative probability theory (1997, 1315) . It is unclear to us why (iii)
should be necessary when conditional transition probabilities between non-commutative events are precisely what Lüder's rule is designed to handle, but we have no interest in pursuing this point. The "common past" requirement on C that prefaces conditions (i)- ( to the algebra that contains C is such that both O∪V 1 and O∪V 2 have a nonempty spacelike complement. Hence his result even applies with V 1 and V 2 taken to be the two unbounded 'Rindler' wedges, each the spacelike complement of the other, the corresponding algebras of which sustain Bell-type correlations in the Minkowski vacuum between the particle contents in the two wedges (Wald, 1994, 114-5) . ( To communicate our residual dissatisfaction with the Redei-made notion of probabilistic common cause, we again translate it into a homely setting. Consider a pair of spin-1 particles described by a composite state residing in a tensor product of two-dimensional Hilbert spaces.
Where {|v i >}, {|w i >}, i = 1 to 3, are complete orthonormal bases for the first and second Hilbert Where P |x> is the projection onto |x>, take A = P |v1> ⊗I ∈ A 1 and B = I⊗P |w1> ∈ A 2 . We see that A and B are positively correlated in |ψ>. For Redei this correlation is probabilistically screened off in |ψ> if there exists a C satisfying (i)-(iv) above. So consider the projection C = (P |v1> + P |v3> )⊗(P |w1> + P |w3> ) .
This C neither entails A nor entails B, which satisfies (i). It receives a probability |c 1 | 2 different from 0 or 1 in |ψ>, which satisfies (ii). Sharing an eigenbasis with both A and B, it commutes with both, which satisfies (iii). Calculating (iv) for our A, B, C and |ψ>, we find all the relevant equations satisfied. Therefore C is a Redei-made probabilistic common cause of A and B.
Note that since C|ψ>/| | Cψ| | = |v 1 >|w 1 >, it follows that Pr |ψ> (A/C) = Pr |ψ> (B/C) = 1. This reminds us that common causes which are "genuinely probabilistic" in Redei's sense can be deterministic in the sense of issuing their effects with probability 1. If the example we've just run seems thereby to depart from the spirit of Redei's interest in genuinely probabilistic common causes, let |v 1´> = |v 1 > + ε |v 3 >, |w 1´> = |w 1 > + ε |w 3 >, ε > 0, and run the example again with |ψ> and C as before, and with A´= P |v1'> ⊗I, B´ = I⊗P |w1'> . A´ and B´ will be positively correlated in |ψ> for sufficiently small ε, and C will again serve them as a genuinely probabilistic Redei-made common cause-but this time not one which acts with probability 1 in |ψ>.
As with Redei-made independence, Redei-made common causes are distressingly easy to come by, because distressingly state independent. The key to C's success in both of the above spin-1 examples is that C projects the state |ψ> onto a state that factorizes into a pair of pure states for the particle pair. Therefore probabilities conditional on C in state |ψ> also factorize, satisfying the conditions (iv) in a stroke! C plays this role despite the fact that the composite state is entangled. Insensitive to what the state of the particle pair actually is, Redei's criterion for the existence of a common cause is insensitive to which correlations that state actually establishes.
But precisely this sensitivity is what an analysis of screening off needs to respect. For to respect it is to acknowledge why our rough causal intuitions distinguish between the straightforward question of whether screeners off are available for the correlations established by factorizable states and the interesting question of whether they're available for the ones established by entangled states. Redei's analysis of probabilistic common causes misses the point of our worries about the absence of such causes in RQFT in much the same way his account of spacelike causal dependence misses the point of our worries about its presence in RQFT. To tell his reassuring stories, Redei must change the subject. Whether it is possible, without changing the subject, to tell any reassuring story extending the notion of cause to the setting of RQFT is a question that remains open. The stubbornness with which it remains open-a stubbornness apparent in its resistance to Redei's resourceful analysis-should prompt us to return to the question of exactly how extending the notion of cause into this exotic domain would further respectable cognitive projects.
Conclusion

